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Abstract This contribution seeks to measure preferences
for health insurance of individuals with and without
chronic conditions in two countries, Germany and the
Netherlands. The objective is to test the presumption that
preferences between these two subpopulations differ and to
see whether having a chronic condition has a different
influence on preferences depending on the country. The
evidence comes from two Discrete Choice Experiments
performed in 2005 (Germany) and 2006 (the Netherlands,
right after a major health reform). Results point to an even
more marked resistance against restrictions of physician
choice among individuals with chronic conditions in both
countries. Thus, the alleged beneficiaries of Disease Man-
agement Programs would have to be highly compensated
for accepting the restrictions that go with them.
Keywords Preference measurement  Health insurance 
Health status  Discrete Choice Experiment  Germany 
The Netherlands
Introduction
This paper considers the preferences with regard to health
insurance of individuals with and without chronic conditions
in two countries, Germany and the Netherlands. While
culturally similar, the two countries differ in their health
policy in that the Netherlands had carried out a major pro-
competitive reform in 2006 while Germany had introduced
new laws and ordnances almost annually in an attempt to
keep down the cost of health care. At the same time, there is
the belief that preferences for attributes of health insurance
strongly depend on health status (one instance of the low-
risk/high-risk distinction in the pioneering model by
Rothschild and Stiglitz [14]; see also Glazer and McGuire
[6]). Empirical evidence bearing on this belief is scarce,
however. In this situation, experimental evidence may be of
some interest. It comes from two Discrete Choice Experi-
ments (DCE) that were performed in Germany (2005) and in
the Netherlands (2006, right after a major pro-competitive
reform). In both samples, participants reported whether or
not they suffered from chronic conditions.
This information provides an opportunity to simulta-
neously throw light on two issues. First, is it true that
individuals with a chronic condition value attributes of
health insurance differently from others? Second, does it
matter whether these individuals live in Germany or the
Netherlands? This paper is structured as follows. First, it
provides some institutional background for the two coun-
tries. Next, it introduces readers to the methodology of
DCE, providing also information about the design of the
two DCE. After the econometric specification, results in
the guise of willingness-to-pay values are presented and
compared between individuals with and without chronic
conditions in the two countries. The last section concludes.
Institutional background
The Netherlands
In 2006, the Netherlands underwent a major healthcare
reform. Prior to 2006, public insurance covered 60% of the
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population, while the remaining 40% had private health
insurance [13]. As of January 1, 2006, this division was
lifted, with (formerly) public and private health insurers
mandated to offer a uniform basic package [12]. At the
same time, every Dutch resident had to explicitly choose a
health insurance policy by the end of March 31, 2006;
silently extending the pre-existing contract was disallowed.
However, consumers were free to purchase additional
coverage for, e.g., dental treatment or physiotherapy.
Dutch health care is financed from two sources. First,
individuals pay annual income-based contributions to the
risk adjustment scheme. Employers are required to com-
pensate their employees for these contributions. Second,
adults pay premiums directly to their insurer of choice,
which sets its own community-rated premium. About two-
thirds of Dutch households receive an income-related
subsidy from the government—a maximum of €1,464 per
household per year [16].
Consumers have the right to form groups (usually
through their work place) to obtain a premium reduction of
up to 10%. Individuals with chronic conditions have also
started groups, but their success importantly depends on
whether the disease in question is a factor in the risk
adjustment formula [1]. If in addition the group is sizable,
insurers are more likely to develop specific products for
particular groups of patients, e.g., of diabetes.
In order to neutralize the incentive for risk selection
induced by premium regulation, adjustment schemes
compensate insurers for taking on high-risk enrollees [19].
Conversely, insurers can compete through product inno-
vations such as Managed Care and Disease Management
Programs and by creating and staffing their own facilities.
In addition, they may sell other products such as supple-
mentary health insurance or car insurance. Increasingly,
these rights will give them greater leverage in negotiating
prices, volumes of service, and quality of care.
Since participants in a DCE are made to hypothetically
choose between the status quo and an alternative, actual
switching behavior is of considerable interest. The oppor-
tunity for switching exists with the new system since
consumers are free to change their insurer and insurance
plan annually. If not satisfied with the premium or quality
of care, they are expected to switch to another insurer,
exposing insurers to competition for high quality of care at
low premiums [4, 9]. De Jong et al. [9] found that while the
main reason for the general population to switch was a
lower premium, chronically ill patients took both coverage
and premium into consideration. Approximately 18% of
the Dutch population switched their insurer in 2006 [5].
One reason for the lack of relevance of quality may be that
Dutch patients had little choice in the domain of ambula-
tory care since they were subject to gatekeeping by general
practitioners, who decide about prescribing drugs as well as
referrals patients to hospital and specialist care [13].
Germany
Germany has the third highest GDP share of health care
expenditure among Organization for Economic Co-operation
and Development (OECD) countries [15]. The average per-
son made 10.0 physician visits per year in 2006 [15], com-
pared to 7.8 for all European countries and 6.8 for the EU [18].
The last major healthcare reform in Germany occurred
in 2000, when members of the statutory health insurance
scheme (SHI) obtained the right to choose between sick
funds. Since then, there have been minor changes accom-
panied by heated debate, with politicians striving to keep
the rate of contributions paid out of labor income for SHI
stable on average. However, the main distinguishing fea-
ture was never touched. While high-income earners (with a
gross monthly salary exceeding EUR 3,862 as of 2004) can
opt out of SHI, those below this threshold are obliged to
join one of the 300 statutory sick funds [7]. Approximately
88% of the population are ‘‘locked in’’ with SHI, while 6%
are fully covered privately [15, 17]. Another 6% (including
civil servants and pensioners) are insured by governmental
schemes [15, 17]. One other minor reform worth men-
tioning, introduced in 2004, is the copayment of EUR 10
per quarter, payable for each initial physician visit (which
includes referrals to a specialist unless authorized by a
general practitioner).
Methodology of DCE
The premise of the DCE [2] is that rational individuals will
always choose the alternative with the higher level of
expected utility. The decision is therefore based on a com-
parison of utility levels attained. Denoting Vij as individual
i’s indirect utility given choice j, one typically posits.
Vij ¼ vi aj; pj; yi; si; ei
 
: ð1Þ
Here, aj is a vector of attributes (pertaining to a health
insurance contract in the present context), pj is the price
(the contribution paid), yi, the individual’s income, and si,
his or her sociodemographic characteristics. The term eij is
a stochastic variable predicated by the Random Utility
Model [11]. This does not mean that decisions are made in
a random way; rather, eij reflects the fact that experimenters
can never observe all determinants of utility. For them,
registered choices therefore contain a random element.
Also note that in a first step, the function vi() is identical
across individuals, an assumption that will be relaxed later
on. As usual, this function is split up into a systematic
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component w() and an additive error term eij. Thus,
respondent i will choose contract j rather than contract l if
w aj; pj; yi; si
 þ eij w al; pl; yisið Þ þ eil: ð2Þ
In stochastic terms, the probability Pij of choosing
alternative j rather than l equals the probability of
inequality (2) occurring, i.e.,
Pij ¼ Pr w aj; pj; yi; si
 þ eij w al; pl; yi; sið Þ þ eil
 
: ð3Þ
This can be rearranged to become an inequality
involving a stochastic and a deterministic part,
Pij ¼ Pr eil  eijð Þw ð Þ  w ð Þ½ : ð4Þ
Thus, the choice in favor of j rather than l requires the
noise on the left-hand side to be dominated by the
systematic utility difference on the right-hand side.
Additionally, the utility function is assumed to be linear
in the K attributes [8],
w ð Þ ¼ c þ b1a1 þ b2a2 þ    þ bKaK : ð5Þ
The parameters b1,…,bK can be interpreted as the
marginal utilities of the attributes. The marginal rate of
substitution between two attributes k and m is given by
MRSk;m ¼ ovi=oakovi=oam; ð6Þ
with the marginal utilities taken from the estimated utility
function. The marginal WTP for a specific attribute amounts
to a special type of MRS. Since a variation in the price
attribute is the negative of the same variation in disposable
income, the marginal WTP of attribute k can be calculated
applying Eq. (6), with the denominator given by the deriv-
ative w.r.t. price (the contribution in the present context).
Figure 1 illustrates the case of two attributes, freedom of
physician choice (m) and income net of the contribution to
health insurance (k). The slope –Dm/Dk of the indifference
curve equals MRSk,m. It indicates how much income the
respondent is willing to forego in order to obtain more
freedom of physician choice, which is nothing but the
marginal WTP for that attribute. It can be inferred from
choices as follows. Let the experimenter offer combination
A. If the respondent opts for A rather than status quo S, then
his or her indifference curve runs below A. Next, let the
experimenter propose B. If the respondent prefers the status
quo S, it must be true that his or her indifference curve is
above B. Evidently, repeated choices allow the experimenter
to interpolate the indifference curve and to estimate MRSk,m
and hence marginal WTP. Accordingly, econometric
inference calls for a probit estimation since the dependent
variable is either 0 (choosing the status quo) or 1 (choosing
the alternative). With respondents making several choices,
the data has a panel structure, suggesting a random-effects
specification [2, 10].
Experimental design
Two different DCEs were designed featuring hypothetical
insurance contracts, one for Germany and one for the
Netherlands. Each DCE had five attributes plus their levels
that include the status quo. This makes for a large number
of potential choice sets (see Table 1 for Germany and
Table 2 for the Netherlands). Pretests performed in Ger-
many resulted in the attributes listed in Table 1. The sur-
vey, involving some 1,000 members of the TNP Panel, was
performed in September 2005. Since the number of pos-
sible combinations of attribute levels is excessive, the
statistical design optimization procedure Gosset was used
to reduce their number to 24, which were randomly split
into three groups of eight choices each.
In the case of the Netherlands, differences in the status
quo suggested two changes from the German DCE (which
were verified in a pretest). First, the gatekeeper model had
to become the benchmark (see ‘‘Institutional background’’),
with free choice an element of the alternative. Second, in
view of the public debate about long waits for obtaining
hospital treatment, the attribute ‘‘Hospital wait’’ replaced
‘‘Second opinion’’, with the wait limited to 4 weeks as a
possible element of the alternative. Third, the Dutch already
were exposed to variable rebates for no claims in health
insurance, which however, could not exceed EUR 255 per
year. This value (rather than zero in Germany) was there-
fore part of the status quo, while EUR 500 per year (as in
Germany) was part of the possible alternatives. The main
survey was fielded in March 2006, after every resident had
explicitly selected a health insurance contract. It involved
763 respondents, again members of the TNP Panel. They
had to make eight choices in 3 groups as well.
In both surveys, the questionnaire also contained a
number of socioeconomic characteristics in addition to age,Fig. 1 Indifference curve defined over two attributes
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sex, and region of residence. In particular, it included four
indicators of health status, viz. (1) subjective health
(excellent to poor), (2) presence of a chronic condition
(subjective), (3) health-related physician visit(s) during the
past 12 months, and (4) hospital visit(s) during the previ-
ous 12 months.
For the present study, variant (2) was retained for the
following reasons. On the one hand, the more objective
indicators (3) and (4) are influenced by ease of access to
physicians and hospitals, which differ markedly between
the two countries. Second, among the subjective indicators,
(1) proved less informative than (2) in preliminary inves-
tigations, likely because current subjective health status
contains a strong transitory component which is absent from
the chronic/non-chronic distinction. No less than 32.5% of
German respondents stated to suffer from a chronic condi-
tion, compared to 27% of their Dutch counterparts.
Econometric specification
First, country-specific core models involving attributes
only were estimated. The equation for the Netherlands
(NL), e.g., reads
NL Pr Altð Þij¼c þ b1NLPhysfree þ b2NLPhyslist
þ b3NLNetwork þ b4NLHosp
þ b5NLService þ b6NLNoclaimsR
þ b7NLDeductible þ b8NLBonus
þ b9NLContrib þ b10 NLContribð Þ2þuij:
ð7Þ
Here, NLPr(Alt)ij denotes the probability of choosing the
alternative rather than the status quo in the Dutch sample.
Note that all explanatory variables are defined in terms of a
Table 1 Product attributes and levels in the main survey: Germany
Attribute Label Levels
Physician choice Status quo: Free choice of physician
GEPhyslist Physician list based on cost and quality criteria
GEGatekeep Gatekeeper model
GENetwork Integrated physician network
Second opinion Status quo: Fee for an initial physician visit and a specialist visit without referral
GESecop Second opinion without additional fee
Additional services Status quo: No particular services provided by insurers
GEService Patient coach/case manager provided by insurer
Incentives Status quo: No incentive system
GENoclaimsR Contribution rebate for no claims of EUR 500/year
GEDeduct Deductible of EUR 500/year
GEBonus Bonus for health-conscious behavior
Insurance contribution GEContrib Status quo: No change
Change in contribution of EUR ± 200, 300, 400, and 500/year
Table 2 Product attributes and levels in the main survey: The Netherlands
Attribute Label Levels
Physician choice Status quo: Gatekeeper model
NLPhysfree Free choice of physician
NLPhyslist Choice of physician based on cost and quality criteria
NLNetwork Integrated network supply
Hospital wait Status quo: Undefined waiting period for hospital treatment
NLHosp Waiting period of 4 weeks max. guaranteed
Additional Services Status quo: no particular services
NLService Patient coach/case manager
Incentive system Status quo: Bonus for no claims of EUR 255/maximum
NLNoclaimsR Contribution rebate for no claims of EUR 500/year
NLDeduct Deductible of EUR 500/year
NLBonus Bonus for health-conscious behavior
Insurance premium NLContrib Status quo: No change, Change in contribution of EUR ± 100, 200, 250, and 300/year
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difference between the alternative and the status quo.
Accordingly, uij ¼ eil  eij
 
, as in Eq. (4).
The results from the two country-specific estimations
suggested three things. First, both (NLContrib)2 and (GE-
Contrib)2 proved to be insignificant. Therefore, the evi-
dence suggests that in the Dutch (NL) as well as in the
German (GE) sample, the marginal utility of income is
constant. Second, the interaction variables of the type
Attribute*C (with C = 1 if the respondent stated to suffer
from a chronic condition) turned out to be significant for
the majority of attributes, pointing to systematic differ-
ences in the marginal utilities of attributes between the
chronic and non-chronic subpopulations. Third, the stan-
dard error of the estimate, while somewhat smaller in the
Dutch estimate (0.042294 vs. 0.042315) was of a compa-
rable magnitude as the German estimate. These findings
support the merging of the two datasets, resulting in the
following specification (NL = 1 if the observation relates
to the Netherlands),
Pr Altð Þij¼c0 þ a1Physfree  NL þ a2Physfree  C
þ a3Physlist þ a4Physlist  NL þ a5Physlist  C
þ a6Physlist  NL  C
þ a7Contrib þ a8Contrib  NL þ a9Contrib  C
þ a10Contrib  NL  C þ a7Contrib  C
þ a8Contrib  NL  þa9Contrib  C
þ a10Contrib  NL  C
þ a11NL þ a12C þ a13NL  C þ u0ij: ð8Þ
The following remarks pertain to this specification.
First, Physfree is an example of an attribute that is relevant
only to the Dutch sample. It therefore only appears
interacted with the NL dummy variable. As before, the
possible differences between the Dutch chronic and non-
chronic subpopulations call for an additional interaction
variable, Physfree*NL*C. Physlist is an example of an
attribute present in both samples. It is interacted with NL to
account for differences in the status quo in Germany
(which is Physfree in Germany rather than Gatekeeper as
in the Netherlands) with C for differences between the
chronic and non-chronic subpopulations, and with NL*C
for these differences in the case of the Netherlands.
Therefore, the reference group is German non-chronic
respondents. Second, it is likely that the attributes retained
do not reflect all determinants of utility. These neglected
determinants may shift the utility and hence probit function
up or down. Apart from age, sex, and the other
socioeconomic characteristics, nationality and permanent
health presumably play an important role, which is
reflected by NL, C, and NL*C.
Estimated parameters from Eq. (8) can be used to derive
marginal WTP values. In case of the physician list for the
Dutch (NL = 1), chronic (C = 1) respondents, e.g., one
obtains, applying Eq. (6),
o Pr Altð Þ=oPhyslist
o PrðAltÞ=oContrib ¼
a3 þ a4 þ a5 þ a6
a7 þ a8 þ a9 þ a10: ð9Þ
Analysis of choice behavior
Preliminary analysis suggested that the Dutch were more
likely to break away from the status quo in three out of four
cases, defined as Dutch vs. German (NL = 0, 1) and with
versus without chronic condition (C = 1, 0). The one
exception was Dutch and German respondents without a
chronic condition, who switched to the alternative with the
same frequency. Therefore, Table 4 reports the choice
behavior of the two national samples combined. It shows
that 20% of respondents never chose the alternative
insurance contract. However, among the ones with chronic
conditions, this figure reaches 29%. Conversely, about 80%
of respondents were flexible in that they switched to the
alternative at least once (out of the eight occasions). Even
among respondents with chronic conditions, this share
amounts to more than 70% and does not go to zero but
remains at 2% for the maximum of eight choices of the
alternative. In summary, even the chronic subsample
‘‘crossed the indifference curve’’ (see Fig. 1 again) suffi-
ciently often to permit inferences about its slope and
location (Table 3).
Overview of WTP values
This section is devoted to a general discussion of the WTP
estimates referring to the column entitled, ‘‘Combined
sample’’ of Table 4. Focusing on the overlapping attributes
first (panel A), one notices that typical MC attributes such
as a physician list put together by the health insurer
(Physlist) and adherence to a physician network (Network)
Table 3 Choices of the alternative over the status quo (Dutch and
German samples combined), in percent
Number of choices Combined sample Chronic Non-chronic
0 20.48 29.10 16.81
1 20.42 22.46 19.55
2 24.21 19.53 26.21
3 19.37 15.82 20.88
4 7.64 5.08 8.74
5 4.20 4.10 4.24
6 1.11 1.17 1.08
7 0.70 30.59 0.75
8 (maximum) 1.87 2.15 1.75
Total in absolute number 1,714 512 1,202
Preferences for health insurance and health status 91
123
are rejected by both the Dutch and German respondents.
The implied compensation asked for by the Dutch is even
higher than by the Germans. This is amazing because the
Dutch are familiar with gatekeeping by physicians, and
policymakers tend to argue that familiarity fosters
acceptance.
Next, additional services provided by the insurer are
not really valued by the Dutch respondents (NLServices)
but clearly by their German counterparts, at the tune of
EUR 123 per year. Both populations agree in their
rejection of an annual EUR 500 deductible. However, the
Dutch value of EUR -407/year is even more marked than
the German (EUR -247/year). Note that a compensation at
this tune (through reduced contributions) could easily be
financed because the health insurer is relieved not only of
EUR 500 but also saves on administrative expense and
from mitigation of moral hazard effects (Zweifel et al.
[20], Chap. 6.3) Without that compensation, however, it
becomes understandable why the Dutch government had
to revoke a (non-compensated) mandatory deductible a
decade earlier.
The two populations differ again with regard to pro-
moting health-conscious behavior (Bonus). While the
Dutch sample does not exhibit a positive WTP value, the
German sample values this attribute at some EUR 202 per
year.
Table 4 WTP values in EUR/
year
*** (**,*) Stata’s non-linear
test for interaction terms in
Probit \1 (\5, \10)% level of
significance. Values in
parentheses are standard errors
calculated using the Delta
method
Attribute Combined sample With chronic condition Without chronic condition
Panel A. Overlapping attributes
NLPhyslist -137.19*** -97.53* -149.74***
(23.55) (51.83) (26.28)
NLNetwork -75.94*** -115.84** -65.08***
(21.97) (49.90) (24.34)
NLService 55.40 51.11 57.88***
(16.60) (37.15) (18.45)
NLDeduct -406.70*** -410.11*** -403.76***
(27.15) (61.26) (30.05)
NLBonus 2.07 -23.07 12.08***
(27.75) (62.37) (30.80)
NLConstant -259.61*** -355.05*** -228.45***
(25.94) (58.57) (28.76)
GEPhyslist -346.39*** -443.68*** -321.69***
(31.26) (74.39) (34.16)
GENetwork -203.28*** -216.93*** -206.70***
(30.02) (69.41) (32.10)
GEService 123.17*** 114.21** 126.27***
(22.48) (52.11) (24.62)
GEDeduct -247.41*** -277.85 -237.15***
(33.66) (77.58) (36.96)
GEBonus 201.52*** 212.67** 195.73***
(38.045) (87.08) (41.90)
GEConstant -499.45*** -643.09*** -444.12***
(36.44) (87.13) (39.64)
Attribute Total population With chronic condition Without chronic condition
Panel B Non-overlapping attributes
NLPhysfree 79.19*** 57.53 86.38***
(21.97) (46.74) (23.85)
NLNoclaimsR 7.96 21.56 5.096
(20.11) (44.59) (22.46)
GEGatekeep -115.36*** -155.88** -106.96***
(29.52) (69.23) (32.21)
GENoclaimsR 358.04*** 320.33*** 375.43***
(30.25) (70.77) (32.99)
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Finally, the two populations agree in their preference for
the status quo. However, status quo bias in the Dutch
sample (EUR 260) amounts to only one-half of the German
value (EUR 500). A possible reason is that the Dutch
respondents had been made to bear the cost of decision-
making in the course of the 2006 reform which required
them to explicitly choose a health insurance policy. By way
of contrast, the Germans had been exposed to a great deal
of public debate but were never made to consider alterna-
tives to the status quo. This interpretation is supported by
the observation that standard errors of WTP estimates are
considerably smaller in the Dutch population in spite of a
smaller sample size. This points to greater homogeneity of
opinions in the Dutch sample, which may well be the
consequence of having borne the cost of information.
Turning to the non-overlapping attributes (panel B of
Table 4), their signs and magnitudes are in line with the-
oretical expectations. First, given that Dutch participants
are subject to gatekeeping under the status quo, they see
free choice of physician as a utility gain, valued at EUR 75
per year. Conversely, German participants would have to
be compensated to give up free physician choice (their
status quo) for gatekeeping. Incidentally the required
compensation of EUR 115 is in the same order of magni-
tude as the WTP value for the Dutch to accept the opposite
change. Second, the Dutch sample does not exhibit any
WTP to deviate from their current rebate for no claims.
This can be interpreted to mean that on average, they are
satisfied with the EUR 255 value. In the German sample,
there is positive WTP for such a high rebate. Since the
current value of the rebate is zero, it is not surprising that
their WTP value is a high EUR 358. What is not known is
whether WTP would be even greater for a smaller value of
the rebate than the proposed EUR 500/year.
Dutch individuals with and without a chronic condition
compared
It is important to note that the two Dutch subpopulations
qualitatively agree on the valuation of all attributes, with
the sole exception of the bonus for health-conscious
behavior which tends to have a positive WTP value among
the group without but a negative value among the group
with chronic condition. However, the two estimates are not
statistically significant. The two Dutch subpopulations also
agree on the magnitude except for one or possibly two
attributes. First, status quo bias among individuals with
chronic conditions amounts to EUR 355 rather than 229, a
statistically significant difference (p \ 0.0001). This is
importantly due to the fact that the marginal utility of
income is low among those with chronic conditions
(p \ 0.0001). To be worthwhile, an investment requires
extended payback time. However, individuals suffering
from a chronic condition have lower remaining life
expectancy and hence payoff time. Therefore, to them, a
change away from the status quo is unlikely to constitute a
profitable investment.
The second difference lacks statistical significance but is
worth mentioning. There is some indication that partici-
pants with chronic conditions would have to be compen-
sated almost twice as much (EUR 116 rather than 65/year)
to accept adherence to a physician network. This points to a
contradiction with established policy views that advance
Disease Management Programs (DMPs) as an innovation
benefitting especially the chronically ill. It appears that the
potential beneficiaries fear above all the lock-in effect of
DMPs which entail physician networks.
German individuals with and without chronic
conditions compared
Among German participants, the two subpopulations are
again in agreement concerning the qualitative valuation of
attributes—this time even without exception. Moreover,
there is also agreement concerning WTP values for attri-
butes. The only exception is a significant difference in
status quo bias (p \ 0.0001). The chronic population
requires a compensation amounting to EUR 634 rather than
444 to change away from the status quo, which is about
50% more, very much like their Dutch counterpart (EUR
355 vs. 229). Again, this difference is importantly due to
participants’ with chronic conditions exhibiting a signifi-
cantly lower marginal utility of income (p \ 0.0000).
Finally, it may be worthwhile to point out that these par-
ticipants would have to be compensated by a contribution
reduction of EUR 444 rather than 322/year for a physician
list. It appears that they fear the lock-in effect of such as list
even more than the general population, causing them to
resist DMPs.
Individuals with a chronic condition: Germany versus
The Netherlands
This section addresses the issue of whether persons with
chronic conditions have different preferences depending on
nationality. When comparing the WTP values for the
overlapping attributes shown in panel A of Table 4, one
notices that the German subsample generally exhibits
higher absolute amounts, with one exception. The Dutch
would have to be compensated by as much as EUR 410/
year to accept an annual deductible of EUR 500, the
Germans, by 278/year. Other differences may be caused by
a difference in the status quo. Specifically, starting from
gatekeeping, the Dutch sample would require an EUR 98
compensation to go along with a physician list. However, if
free choice of physician had been the point of departure,
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EUR 58 of WTP would have to be added to this figure
(assuming that the transition from gatekeeping to free
choice is valued the same as the transition from free choice
to gatekeeping once status quo bias is controlled for; see
panel B). Therefore, changing from free physician choice
to an insurer-imposed physician list requires an estimated
EUR 156 (= 98 ? 58) which still falls short of the EUR
444 in the German sample.
Likewise, the Dutch figure of EUR 116 to compensate
for adherence to a physician network would have to be
scaled up by EUR 98 to become EUR 214 if free choice
had been the status quo. This is quite close to the German
figure of EUR 217. Thus, persons with chronic conditions
in both countries reject two important Managed Care fea-
tures, with the Germans even more opposed to a physician
list. A marked difference concerns the bonus for health-
conscious behavior. Dutch people with chronic conditions
do not place positive value on this, whereas their German
counterparts would be willing to pay EUR 114. Finally,
while status quo bias amounts to EUR 355 among the
Dutch participants, it reaches the maximum of EUR 643
among the German participants, again due to a lower
marginal utility of income.
Individuals without a chronic condition: Germany
versus The Netherlands
Among individuals without chronic conditions, once more
the German WPT values are larger, with the exception of
the compensation required for accepting an EUR 500
deductible. Such a deductible is rejected as strongly by the
Dutch non-chronic as the German non-chronic subpopu-
lation. With regard to the two Managed Care attributes,
WTP values of the two countries again have to be adjusted
for differences in status quo. Noting that WTP for free
choice amounts to EUR 86 in the Dutch sample (see panel
B of Table 4), one can estimate the compensation required
for accepting a physician list as EUR 236 (=150 ? 86),
which is not much less than the EUR 322 for the German
sample (measured from free choice of physician). In the
case of a physician network, the value becomes EUR 151
(=65 ? 86), only slightly lower than the EUR 207 esti-
mated for the German sample. As in the case of individuals
with chronic conditions, Dutch respondents put a lower
value on extra insurer services than the German subsample,
and they have no positive WTP for a bonus honoring
health-conscious behavior (valued at EUR 196/year by
German non-chronic respondents). Finally, status quo bias
amounts to EUR 229, less than the EUR 444 in the German
sample (p \ 0.0012). This is remarkable because the Dutch
have a lower marginal utility of income than the German
respondents (p \ 0.0000), which per se causes WTP values
to be high.
Discussion and conclusion
This paper seeks to measure preferences for health insur-
ance attributes as a function of health status in two coun-
tries, Germany and the Netherlands. Since observed
choices are distorted by regulated contributions that do not
reflect the marginal cost of these attributes, market exper-
iments of the Discrete Choice (DCE) type were performed
in 2005 (Germany) and 2006 (the Netherlands, right after a
health reform), respectively. The two major research
questions were (1) Do individuals with a chronic condition
(as an indicator of permanent health status) value attributes
of health insurance differently from the other? and (2) Do
these valuation depend on the country?
With regard to the first question, the answer is clear. In
both countries, Managed Care features such as a physi-
cian list established by the insurer or a physician network
tend to be more strongly resisted by respondents with
chronic conditions. This suggests that Disease Manage-
ment Programs (which typically impose restrictions of
this type on participants) may not match the preferences
of designated beneficiaries. Moreover, the chronic sub-
populations exhibit even stronger status quo bias than
their non-chronic counterparts, which would have to be
overcome by a compensation as high as EUR 643 in the
case of Germany.
As to the second question, yes it does make a differ-
ence whether a Dutch or a German person has a chronic
condition. Even when measuring the Dutch WTP values
from free physician choice (the German status quo),
estimates point to less resistance to a physician list in the
Netherlands than in Germany. Also, Dutch persons with a
chronic condition do not value additional services pro-
vided by the health insurer whereas the Germans do. On
the other hand, they resist an EUR 500 annual deductible
even more strongly than their German counterparts, the
required compensation reaching EUR 410/year. This is in
accordance with the fact that the Dutch government had
to repeal the introduction of a (non-compensated)
deductible a decade earlier. Also, Dutch status quo bias
amounts to an estimated EUR 355, clearly lower than the
EUR 643 cited above for the Germans. Since a similar
difference holds true for the non-chronic subpopulations
as well, it may well be due to the Dutch 2005/6 reform,
which made citizens explicitly choose their health insur-
ance contract.
There are a few limitations to this study that need to be
pointed out. First, the non-chronic German subpopulation
exhibits systematically lower WTP values than the Dutch
counterpart. This is due to their significantly higher mar-
ginal utility of income [see Eq. (6) again]. A possible
explanation is that this reflects the fact that the non-chronic
German subpopulation is financially better off than the
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Dutch (while chronic populations have similar income
levels).
Second, there is the difficulty that for between-country
comparisons, WTP values need to be measured from a
common status quo. However, it is unclear whether the
Dutch value a change from gatekeeping to free physician
choice (which was part of the DCE) the same way as from
free physician choice to gatekeeping, although status quo
bias was controlled for. The reason is that changing one
single attribute likely evokes a status quo bias different
from changing all of them [an issue addressed by so-called
effects coding, see Beck and Gyrd-Hansen [3]].
In spite of these limitations, however, two results stand
out. First, Managed Care restrictions typically imposed as
part of Disease Management Programs tend to be resisted
especially by those with chronic conditions, the designated
beneficiaries. Second, deductibles would have to be com-
pensated in both countries and in both subpopulations.
These findings do not forebode well for policy makers who
consider introducing Disease Management Programs or
copayments without making a binding commitment in the
guise of reduced health insurance contributions or taxes.
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